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The Pell Grant program is the largest means-tested ﬁnancial assistance
available to postsecondary students across the United States. Students
from all types of degree granting postsecondary institutions can apply for
Pell Grants. In 2000–2001, the federal government awarded almost $8 bil-
lion in Pell Grants among more than 3.8 million students, roughly one-
third of all college students (College Board 2001). President Bush’s 2003
budget allocates over $10.9 billion dollars for an estimated 4.5 million Pell
Grant recipients (U.S. Department of Education 2002), potentially repre-
senting a 32.4 percent increase in the number of students receiving Pell
Grants since the 1990–1991 school year. Yet despite this continued expan-
sion of the Pell Grant, researchers have only limited evidence on the causal
eﬀects of these grants.
Most Pell Grant-related research focuses on the eﬀects of Pell Grants on
enrollment decisions, speciﬁcally focusing on initial enrollment and choice
amongst colleges (see Kane 1999; Ehrenberg and Sherman 1984; Leslie
and Brinkman 1987; Seftor and Turner 2002). However, there is surpris-
ingly little research measuring the causal eﬀect of Pell Grants on student
outcomes in college (e.g., persistence, graduation). Regardless of whether
Pell Grants aﬀect initial enrollment patterns, Pell Grants may indepen-
dently aﬀect student outcomes.
Moreover, studying the eﬀects of need-based aid on student outcomes
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Long, Jon Guryan, and especially Caroline Hoxby. All errors are my own.be on the margin of “stopping out.”1 At Ohio four-year colleges in 1999–
2000, 18 percent of full-time freshmen who were noteligible for Pell Grants
withdrew from college by the next year, while 28 percent of students who
were eligible for a Pell Grant did not enroll the following year. It is an open
question whether Pell Grants and other need-based aid programs aﬀect
these margins. This paper attempts to resolve these questions. Using
unique student data from Ohio, this paper measures the causal relation-
ship between need-based aid and student retention.
A study of the eﬀects of need-based aid on student retention may be of
interest to both policymakers and educational researchers. As Sarah
Turner argues in her chapter in this volume, policymakers have often paid
more attention to improving student access to college rather than improv-
ing student retention once in college. However, as college enrollment rates
continue to increase while completion rates do not, both policymakers and
researchers have begun focusing more heavily on indicators of student re-
tention (e.g., DesJardins, Ahlburg, and McCall 1999; St. John, Hu, and
Tuttle 2000; St. John, Hu, and Weber 2000), and the relationship between
ﬁnancial need and persistence is central to many of these studies (e.g., Des-
Jardins, Ahlburg, and McCall 2002; St. John, Musoba, and Simmons
2003).
There are a number of reasons why more research has not investigated
the eﬀects of Pell Grants on student collegiate outcomes. One reason is that
researchers have diﬃculty distinguishing between the eﬀects of family
characteristics and the eﬀects of Pell Grants. Pell Grants are a means-
tested program. Comparisons between Pell Grant recipients and non-Pell
Grant recipients (e.g., Wei and Carroll 2002) may be diﬃcult to interpret
since Pell Grant recipients are poorer and may be more likely to drop out,
even in the absence of need-based aid. To correct for such bias, researchers
must suﬃciently control for family characteristics.
Additionally, identifying the eﬀects of Pell Grants is diﬃcult since much
of the variation in the size of students’ Pell Grants is correlated with stu-
dents’ college enrollment decisions. For example, college choice and the
size of a student’s Pell Grant are directly connected. Students who attend
more expensive (and often higher-quality) schools are eligible for larger
Pell Grants than students at other colleges or universities. Pell Grants are
also more generous for full-time rather than part-time students. Even in the
absence of Pell Grants, students who beneﬁt most from college are more
likely than other students to attend more expensive schools and to attend
full-time. However, since Pell Grant awards are systematically higher for
these same students, it may be diﬃcult to identify the eﬀects of the Pell
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1. “Stopping out” refers to students who withdraw from school after their ﬁrst year. These
students are not “dropouts” because many of these students do not leave school permanently,
and their undergraduate credit hours do not “expire.” I use these terms interchangeably
throughout the paper.Grant separate from college enrollment eﬀects. To avoid this bias, re-
searchers must exploit variation in Pell Grants that is independent of col-
lege choice (e.g., discontinuities in the Pell Grant formula).
A ﬁnal reason that researchers have been unable to identify the eﬀects of
Pell Grants on outcomes is the absence of accurate data, in particular, the
absence of accurate persistence and detailed ﬁnancial data. Some re-
searchers have measured persistence at a particular university; however, in
these data, researchers cannot distinguish between a student who trans-
ferred to another school and one who withdraws from college. Other sur-
vey-based data rely on students’ self-reports of their college experience.
These data may not be as reliable as administrative data since students may
not recall or do not wish to report small periods of time when they with-
drew from college.
Financial data are equally as diﬃcult to obtain. Most of the students
who receive Pell Grants do not attend elite, expensive institutions, nor do
they have substantial family support. Pell Grant recipients (and much of
the variation in their awards) typically come from less-expensive colleges
and their family contributions are much smaller. Moreover, the variation
in Pell Grants is typically small. Exact ﬁnancial data are necessary both to
identify the small variations in Pell Grants and to employ creative identiﬁ-
cation strategies. Survey data (e.g., High School and Beyond, National Ed-
ucational Longitudinal Survey) do not oﬀer the level of detail necessary to
identify accurately the level of students’ Pell Grants.
To examine the eﬀects of the Pell Grant, this paper presents evidence
from data gathered by the Ohio Board of Regents (OBR). These data do
not have the shortcomings of other data sets and oﬀer a level of detail on
both persistence and ﬁnancial variables that is not available in other data.
Since 1998, OBR has collected comprehensive data on college enrollment
in Ohio’s public two- and four-year colleges. As a result, the OBR data
tracks students within and across schools. With the data, researchers can
distinguish between students who withdraw from school and students who
transfer to other Ohio schools. Moreover, through collaborative agree-
ments, OBR has expanded the data to include students’ American College
Test (ACT) scores and data from the Free Application for Federal Student
Aid (FAFSA). The FAFSA data are the exact data used by institutions to
determine the amount of students’ Pell Grant eligibility.
The level of detail in the ﬁnancial data also facilitates the use of statisti-
cal tools that are impractical using other data. In particular, the level of de-
tail allows researchers to identify small discontinuities in the Pell Grant
formula. These discontinuities may be exploited to identify the causal
eﬀects of the voucher. While this paper may not completely resolve biases
from college choice and enrollment or family background, the discontinu-
ity analysis may be the best available method for dealing with such biases.
The paper presents evidence on the eﬀects of Pell Grants using both
How Financial Aid Aﬀects Persistence 209panel and cross-sectional variation.2 The panel speciﬁcations suggest that
need-based ﬁnancial aid reduces students’ stop-out behavior. In identify-
ing this eﬀect, the paper shows that students who receive Pell Grants after
their ﬁrst year are a unique subset of students who applied for ﬁnancial aid
in their ﬁrst year. Failure to control for this selection may confound causal
estimates of the Pell Grant program.
The paper also presents evidence relying on cross-sectional variation.
The paper estimates the eﬀects of Pell Grants close to existing discontinu-
ities in family size. The results based on discontinuity approaches suggest
that Pell Grants increase persistence; however, the results are not robust to
alternative speciﬁcations.
Section 5.1 of this paper presents a simple economic model of student
persistence under uncertainty. Section 5.2 of the paper explains the OBR
data in greater detail. Section 5.3 of the paper presents the empirical strate-
gies and results. Section 5.4 discusses policy implications of the results and
concludes.
5.1 Economic Model
Economists often model educational attainment as investment in hu-
man capital. Even basic economics classes teach that students will choose
an education level that maximizes the expected present discounted value
(PDV) of future wage payments less the expected PDV of educational
costs. There have been a number of permutations to this model—factoring
in scholarship aid, allowing the returns to education to vary, and showing
how predicted education levels vary with expectations (Manski 1993). This
paper investigates the relationship between ﬁnancial aid and outcomes.
Rather than use a traditional human capital model, the paper models stu-
dents’ dropout behavior using a multistage investment model.
Multistage investment models are particularly useful in cases where the
agent must reevaluate the project after an initial period of time. For example,
Myers and Majd (1990) investigate optimal abandonment rules for ﬁrms.
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) review other examples of multistage investments.
The phenomenon of interest—students’ stop-out behavior—is similar
to these multistage investments. In the initial period, students must decide
whether to attend the ﬁrst year of college. After completion of the ﬁrst year,
students must then reevaluate whether to complete the next year. About 20
percent of ﬁrst-time freshmen withdraw from four-year colleges after the
ﬁrst year.
To formalize the model, let person i’s wage at time t (wit) be modeled as a
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2. It is important to distinguish between the eﬀects of Pell Grants in general and the eﬀects
of Pell Grants conditional on initial enrollment. This paper focuses on estimating the eﬀect of
persistence conditional on a student having enrolled. I discuss in the following the relation-
ship between the conditional eﬀects of Pell Grants and the unconditional eﬀects.function of years of college (st) and ability (ai), which is not perfectly
known to the student. Let the cost of education at time t (ct) be the diﬀer-
ence between announced tuition (T t) and ﬁnancial aid. Financial aid con-
tains two components: the need-based component is a function of initial
wealth (I0) and the number of children attending college at time t (nt); the
merit-based component is a function of perceived ability at time t. Let Et[]
denote the expectation operator conditional on information at time t.
(1) wit   f(sit, ai)
(2) ct   T t   g(I0, nt)   h(ai)
A student will attend a ﬁrst year of college if the expected value of in-





Rt 1[f(sit   1, ai)   f(sit   0, ai)] 
  E0[f(si1   0, ai)   T 1   g(I0, n1)   h(ai)]
At the start of the ﬁrst year, a student will indicate an intention to attend




Rt 2[f(sit   2, ai)   f(sit   1, ai)] 
  E0[f(si2   1, ai)   T 2   g(I0, n2)   h(ai)].
We could solve the decision rules for the maximum tuition level that a
student would be willing to pay. For simplicity, let’s assume that tuition is
fully known one year in advance.
(5) E0(T∗
1)   T∗
1
 E0 g(I0, n1)  h(ai)  f(si1 0, ai)  ∑
T
t 2




 E0 g(I0, n2)  h(ai)  f(si2 1, ai)  ∑
T
t 3
Rt 2[f(sit 2, ai)  f(sit 1, ai)] 
These tuition levels are likely the formulae that students use to make any
decisions about the second year of school that must be made during the
ﬁrst year. For example, a student wanting to transfer to another university
must ﬁle that application during the ﬁrst year. Also, students who want ﬁ-
nancial aid in their second year must ﬁle applications during their ﬁrst
How Financial Aid Aﬀects Persistence 211year. With these types of decisions in mind, there are a few insights that
come from comparing these two tuition values:
1. For a given level of ability, if the returns to schooling are linear (or
even concave) in schooling and scholarship aid does not change, then the
maximum tuition that a student will pay falls over time. Hence, many stu-
dents may rationally choose to get only one year of school.
2. Even if the returns to schooling are convex and scholarship aid does
not change, then the maximum tuition a student is willing to pay may still
decrease over time, leading to more planned attrition.3
3. Even expected changes in ﬁnancial aid can alter the maximum that
students would be willing to pay, leading to students to plan on withdraw-
ing or transferring.
4. Since students must apply for second-year ﬁnancial aid during their
ﬁrst year, they will do so only if they perceive that their beneﬁts exceed
costs in both periods.4
There are also a number of decisions about the second year that can be
made after the ﬁrst year—for example, the decision to withdraw from col-
lege altogether. Students make these decisions after gaining another year
of information on which to base their decisions. The student will choose to
attend another year if the expected value of the increase in lifetime earn-





Rt 2[f(sit 2, ai)  f(sit 1, ai)] 
 E1[f(si2 1, ai)  T 2 g(I0, n2)  h(ai)]
We could rewrite this decision rule solving for the maximum tuition levels




 E1 g(I0, n2)  h(ai)  f(si2 1, ai)  ∑
T
t 3
Rt 2[f(sit 2, ai)  f(sit 1, ai)] 
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3. Holding scholarship aid constant and as T →  , the maximum tuition rises only if the
following inequality is satisﬁed:
(1   r)E0[f(sit   2, ai)   f(sit   1, ai)]   E0[f(sit   1, ai)   f(sit   0, ai)]
If in the extreme case, there is a “sheepskin” eﬀect of a degree (i.e., returns only to a two- or
four-year degree), then the inequality is always satisﬁed. Typical models of sequential invest-
ment show that the willingness to pay increases over time. The key diﬀerence is the usability
of capital. Students may be able to drop out of colleges and use a year of college in the labor
market.
4. There may be a small group who apply for ﬁnancial aid even though they expect not to
attend the second year. There is an option value to applying for ﬁnancial aid because ability
is not known perfectly (see discussion by Sarah Turner in chapter 1 in this volume).Notice that the diﬀerence between equations (8) and (6) is the information
set. Students have a chance to update their expectations with information
from their ﬁrst year of school. As the model stands, the updating comes in
terms of ability. Similar to the model in Manski (1993), students discover
their ability by attending college. Knowing the ability then changes the
willingness to pay.
We could have also changed this model by introducing uncertainty in the
ﬁnancial aid formula. Unexpected changes in ﬁnancial aid might lower the
maximum tuition price that students might be willing to pay. For example,
if a student’s expected ﬁnancial aid oﬀer falls, the maximum that a student
would be willing to pay declines. The student may wish to transfer to a
cheaper school or drop out altogether.
A simple insight of the model is that changes in ﬁnancial aid matter. Pre-
vious work on the eﬀects of ﬁnancial aid has looked at relationships be-
tween student outcomes and both changes and levels of aid. Recent work
by Wetzel, O’Toole, and Peterson (1999) look at changes in ﬁnancial aid for
students at Virginia Commonwealth University. They ﬁnd that increases in
need-based ﬁnancial aid likely improved student retention. Other work by
Singell (2001) looks at the eﬀects of the level of ﬁnancial aid in the ﬁrst year.
He ﬁnds that the higher the student’s levels of need-based ﬁnancial aid, the
more likely the student is to graduate.
While the model in this paper suggests that decisions about enrollment
in the second year rely on ﬁnancial aid changes rather than levels, there
may be reasons that the level of ﬁnancial aid in the ﬁrst year matters. If the
level of ﬁnancial aid in the ﬁrst year creates some inertia or helps to shape
expectations about the ﬁnancial aid oﬀer in the second period, the level
may aﬀect the student in the next year. One example of this type of eﬀect is
the application for second-year ﬁnancial aid. The higher a student’s Pell
Grant in the ﬁrst year, the more likely the student will apply for a second-
year award. If students expect to get a low second-year award, they may
never even apply for ﬁnancial aid.
The level of ﬁnancial aid may even have deleterious consequences on the
student. The model implicitly assumes that ﬁnancial aid does not change
students’ behavior in other ways. But for example, if a student receives ﬁ-
nancial aid, he or she may be more detached from college. The student may
not fully engage and take college seriously since his or her money is not on
the line. In this way, Pell Grants eliminate the “sunk cost fallacy” for the
student.5 Since Pell Grant recipients did not make this initial investment
(the federal government did instead), they may not have as strong of an in-
centive to work hard in school as students who made this initial investment
themselves. As a result, Pell Grant recipients may perform worse. The
model may capture some of this through the updates on students’ abilities.
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5. The “sunk cost fallacy” suggests that people often devote greater resources and more
eﬀort in areas where they have already made an investment.Controlling for students’ performance in school gives a clear indicator of
whether they are exerting eﬀort. The empirical results will investigate this
hypothesis more fully.
Although they are outside of the scope of this paper, there are other out-
comes in which we might be interested that are related to either the level or
change in ﬁnancial aid. For example, we might be interested in how ﬁnan-
cial aid aﬀects the number of credits that a student successfully attempts.
Students without ﬁnancial aid may be reluctant to take loans and may
spend more time working on the side. On the other hand, students without
ﬁnancial aid may want to cram in more credits per semester to try to reduce
the number of semesters they have to attend (and as a result the total cost
of college). We might also be interested in knowing how grade point aver-
ages (GPAs) vary with ﬁnancial aid. In particular, if the level of ﬁnancial
aid aﬀects hours attempted, completed, or GPAs, it might also aﬀect stu-
dents’ perception of their abilities and, in the context of the previous
model, aﬀect their likelihood of completing college.
5.2 Data
The data for this project come from the OBR. Through a collaborative
agreement with the OBR, the OBR has allowed me to access anonymous
student data from Ohio’s public institutions. The data are provided by the
respective institutions to the OBR and include information on student de-
mographics, enrollment, credit hours completed, and GPAs.
The OBR has collaborative arrangements with other agencies that allow
them to expand the data. For example, the OBR links the student records
to ACT and Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) records. Most Ohio students
take the ACT exam, and the ACT records include the highest test score of
the student and the most recent responses to the ACT survey (which in-
cludes student-reported data on high school performance). The OBR also
links students to their respective FAFSA. The FAFSA data include de-
tailed information about the ﬁnances of both students and their families.
From the FAFSA, the variable of most interest is the “Estimated Family
Contribution” that colleges use to award grants based on ﬁnancial need.
One important limitation of the data is that they only include informa-
tion about need-based ﬁnancial aid. From FAFSA data, we know students’
eligibility for federal grants and loans. We also know students’ eligibility
for Ohio’s Instructional Grant program, a state-run need-based ﬁnancial
aid award. The data do not include information about merit-based ﬁnan-
cial aid. Ohio institutions are reluctant to divulge merit-based awards since
these rewards are central to their recruitment strategies. While I do not ob-
serve merit aid, I observe students’ GPAs once in college, their ACT scores,
and their (self-reported) high school GPAs. If these variables adequately
control for student ability and if colleges determine need- and merit-based
214 Eric Bettingerawards separately, then not knowing students’ merit-based awards should
not aﬀect the estimated results.
Another limitation of the data is that they only include students attend-
ing Ohio public universities. Students from Ohio that attend universities in
other states, including the nation’s elite schools, and students that attend
private schools in Ohio are excluded from the sample.6These exclusions are
both a weakness and a strength of these data. Excluding elite students may
make the results not generalizable to all college students; however, exclud-
ing elite students gives us the opportunity to describe how ﬁnancial aid af-
fects students at nonelite schools. These nonelite schools educate the ma-
jority of college students and may be places where ﬁnancial constraints are
more binding.
Another concern related to the inclusion of Ohio public institutions
alone is the measurement of dropout behavior. Students who transfer from
Ohio public institutions to institutions located in other states are indistin-
guishable in the data from students who withdraw from Ohio public uni-
versities. This potential bias, however, should be very small because the
percentage of students who probably transferred makes up a small fraction
of the total number of observed dropouts.7
I focus entirely on the incoming freshman class in the 1999–2000 school
year. These are the ﬁrst students for whom FAFSA data are available
through the OBR. I include students who enrolled in any college, including
community colleges, for the ﬁrst time in 1999, and I track these students
through the 2000–2001 school year.
Table 5.1 provides summary statistics for the sample. At four-year insti-
tutions, about 10 percent of incoming full-time freshmen are from other
states, and students are much less likely to be commuter students than at
two-year colleges. At two-year colleges, which include local and state-run
community colleges and technical colleges, about 2 percent of all students
live on campus. Similar to other national surveys, the average age of ﬁrst-
time freshmen at two-year colleges is considerably higher than at four-year
colleges, and students complete fewer semester hours in their ﬁrst year
(thirteen at four-year colleges as compared to eleven at two-year colleges).
Seventy-ﬁve percent of incoming freshmen at Ohio’s four-year colleges
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6. Ohio State University and Miami University are the top ranked public universities in
Ohio. In the 2004 version of U.S. News & World Report’s college rankings, they rank 60th and
64th, respectively, among national universities with doctoral programs. Other high ranking
institutions in Ohio (e.g., Oberlin) are private colleges.
7. The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) tracks the number of
transfers at each institution but does not record the state of residence of transfer students al-
though it does track the states of residence for incoming freshmen. Assuming that transfer
students are geographically representative of the incoming freshman class, then one would ex-
pect around 650 Ohio students to transfer to the non-Ohio schools with substantial Ohio en-
rollments. If we further assume that all 650 transfer students just ﬁnished their ﬁrst year of
school, then about 4.3 percent of observed dropouts are actually transfer students.took the ACT exam while only 45 percent of students at two-year colleges
took the exam. The four-year college students performed better than the
two-year college students. Throughout the paper, I will at times restrict the
sample to students who took the ACT exam. Not only do I know these stu-
dents test scores, but I also have additional (self-reported) data on these
students’ high school experiences.
Throughout the paper, I will also restrict the sample at times to those stu-
dents who ﬁled a FAFSA in both fall 1999 and fall 2000. About 65 percent
of four-year students and 63 percent of two-year students submitted FAF-
SAs in 1999; however, only 49 percent and 40 percent, respectively, ﬁled
FAFSAs in 2000. As explained below, not observing FAFSA data for many
applicants leads to substantial biases in the results using panel identiﬁca-
tion. The average, uncovered ﬁnancial need is small across all students, but
conditional on it being positive, the uncovered ﬁnancial need is slightly
greater than $1,400 for students at four-year schools.
Table 5.2shows some basic least squares regressions of student stop-out
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Table 5.1 Average Student Characteristics
4-Year College 2-Year College
Out-of-state student .103 .032




Hours completed by fall 1999 13.4 11.2
(4.7) (6.3)
Left institution after 1 year .278 .491
Left higher education after 1 year .201 .431
Took ACT exam .750 .446
ACT composite score (36   max) 21.8 18.9
(4.3)
Filed FAFSA for fall 1999 .653 .628
Uncovered ﬁnancial need ($) 423.0 24.1
(716.1) (172.4)
Uncovered ﬁnancial need conditional  1,081.8 82.0
on being  0 (773.7) (310.5)
Filed FAFSA for fall 2000 .490 .399
Uncovered ﬁnancial need ($) 1,261.5 21.3
(951.4) (93.1)
Uncovered ﬁnancial need conditional  1,400.2 41.3
on being  0 (900.2) (126.5)
Change in Pell Grant (conditional on Pell  1,691 881
eligibility in 1999 or 2000) (994) (762)
Source: Author’s calculations from unpublished data from the Ohio Board of Regents.
Notes: Standard deviations appear in parentheses for nonbinary variables. Data are for full-
time students who ﬁrst entered Ohio public colleges and/or universities in fall 1999. Uncov-
ered ﬁnancial need equals tuition less the estimated family contribution from the FAFSA less
any Pell Grant for which the student was eligible.behavior on the level of students’ ﬁnancial aid. These regressions are not
meant to show the causal eﬀect of Pell Grants but rather to demonstrate as-
sociations between the stop-out behavior, ﬁnancial aid awards, and other
covariates. These regressions are also useful in understanding the types
of biases present in the data. Comparing the various speciﬁcations will
help identify important biases.
Column (1) shows a regression of whether a student drops out or not re-
gressed on the student’s ﬁnancial aid award. The regression includes ﬁxed
eﬀects that control for the school that the student attends. The estimated
coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that larger awards are pos-
itively associated with dropout behavior. As mentioned before, however,
these coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly biased for a number of reasons. For ex-
ample, when we include controls for an individual’s socioeconomic back-
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Table 5.2 Association between Financial Aid and Stop-Out Behavior (dependent variable:
student stopped out)
Students Taking
ACT Exam All Students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level of ﬁnancial aid (000s) .033 .006 .0002 –.005 .005 .002
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Log of parents’ income –.036 –.030 –.042 –.030 –.024
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.005)
Out-of-state student .072 .055 .041 .365 .165
(.077) (.073) (.073) (.152) (.172)
Age .022 .018 .020 .018 .016
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005)
Male .029 .003 .003 .017 –.002
(.005) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005)
Lives on campus –.082 –.057 –.112 –.079 –.062
(.007) (.007) (.004) (.007) (.007)
Took the ACT –.113 –.063 –.088
(.007) (.007) (.007)
ACT score –.0003 .004
(.0007) (.001)
Freshman grade point average –.138 –.136 –.132
(.003) (.003) (.003)
Includes high school GPA 
controls No No No No Yes Yes
Includes race ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Includes campus ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
R2 .108 .112 .204 .192 .091 .169
No. of observations 37,028 30,851 29,778 29,778 24,627 24,012
Source: Author’s calculations from unpublished data from the Ohio Board of Regents
Notes: White standard errors are in parentheses. Data are for full-time students who ﬁrst entered Ohio
public colleges and/or universities in fall 1999. The sample varies across columns due to missing data on
student characteristics or ﬁrst-year GPA data.ground and personal characteristics in column (2), the estimated relation-
ship drops signiﬁcantly.8 The estimated relationship drops dramatically
(from 0.033 to 0.006) and is still signiﬁcant. Column (5) is similar to col-
umn (2) except that I focus only on students who took the ACT exam, in-
cluding controls for a student’s high school performance and entrance
exam scores. The estimated coeﬃcient is similar to column (2) but is no
longer signiﬁcant. The other rows in columns (2) and (5) suggest that
wealthier students are less likely to stop out; out-of-state students are more
likely to drop out; older students and men are more likely to withdraw; and
students living on campus and students who took the ACT (and performed
well on it) are less likely to stop out.
In column (3), I add controls for students’ grades during their freshman
years of school. As previously mentioned, a Pell Grant may have had a
negative eﬀect since students with a Pell Grant may have had less of a ﬁ-
nancial commitment to schooling and may not have worked as hard. In-
cluding GPA should control for these students and may further weaken the
estimated relationship between ﬁnancial aid and stop-out behavior. As
shown in table 5.2, the estimated relationship is smaller than in columns
(1), (2), and (5). The result is also not statistically diﬀerent from zero. In
column (6), I estimate a similar regression for students who took the ACT
exam. Again, the estimated relationship is indistinguishable from zero.
In column (4), I estimate the relationship, controlling for personal and
family characteristics and grades during a student’s ﬁrst year. I exclude the
ﬁxed eﬀects for students’ campuses of attendance. These ﬁxed eﬀects also
control for diﬀerences in quality, price, and other unobservable campus
characteristics (e.g., the strength of a campuses freshman intervention
programs). These ﬁxed eﬀects control for the fact that students attend-
inglower-quality schools (who also receive smaller ﬁnancial aid awards be-
cause tuition is smaller) are more likely to withdraw than students attend-
ing better schools (who receive higher ﬁnancial aid awards for similar
reasons). Without these ﬁxed eﬀects, we would expect the estimated
relationship between ﬁnancial aid and student stop-out behavior to be
even smaller and maybe even negative. This is exactly what column (4) of
table 5.2 shows. The estimated relationship suggests that higher ﬁnancial
aid awards are negatively associated with student stop-out behavior.
5.3 Estimating the Causal Eﬀects
There are three sources of variation that economists can use to identify
the eﬀects of Pell Grants: time series, panel, and cross-sectional. In this sec-
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8. The sample sizes fall across columns in table 5.2. The ﬁrst column includes all students
in the sample. The second column includes only those students for whom demographic data
are available. Columns (3) and (4) further restrict the sample to students who had a freshman
GPA reported to the OBR. Columns (5) and (6) are based on the subsample of students who
took the ACT exam.tion, I discuss the feasibility of each of these identiﬁcation strategies using
the OBR data. I also present the basic empirical results for each identiﬁca-
tion strategy.
Each strategy aims at identifying the eﬀects of Pell Grants conditional
on initial enrollment. However, Pell Grants may aﬀect enrollment, and, as a
consequence, some students who would not be enrolled without Pell
Grants would be included in the analysis, making the parameter estimated
in this paper more diﬃcult to interpret. If a Pell Grant aﬀects enrollments,
then the parameter estimated in this paper would be a combination of two
diﬀerent eﬀects: (1) the eﬀect of Pell Grants on the persistence behavior of
students who would have attended college in the absence of the Pell Grant;
and (2) the eﬀect of Pell Grants on the persistence behavior of students
who would not have attended school without the Pell Grant.
Under some circumstances, the latter eﬀect does not matter. For ex-
ample, any potential bias depends on the degree to which Pell Grants aﬀect
enrollment. If the Pell Grant has no eﬀect, then the parameter estimated in
this paper represents only the eﬀect of the Pell Grant on all students eli-
gible for Pell Grants. If the Pell Grant has a small eﬀect, then any bias in
the estimated parameter is likely to be small. Most of the research on Pell
Grants and enrollment suggest that the Pell Grant has had either no eﬀect
or a very small positive eﬀect on enrollment (see Kane 1999; Leslie and
Brinkman 1987).
Additionally, if the unobservable factors that can potentially bias any
estimate of the eﬀect of Pell Grants on persistence are similar for those
people for whom Pell Grants inﬂuenced enrollment decisions and those
people for whom they did not, then the eﬀect of Pell Grants estimated in
this paper should be the same for both groups. For example, suppose that
unobservable family characteristics aﬀect both the size of students’ Pell
Grants and their likelihood of dropping out. We typically think that these
unobserved characteristics likely bias our estimate of the eﬀects of Pell
Grants downward. If the bias is the same for students for whom Pell Grants
did and did not aﬀect initial enrollments, then the bias should be symmet-
ric across both groups, and, while the overall parameter may be biased by
these unobservables, the overall parameter is not made up of two compo-
nents. If we can control for these unobservables in our empirical design, we
can estimate a single parameter that is easily interpreted. However, if the
determinants of persistence are not constant across groups, then the pa-
rameter will remain a combination of the two aforementioned eﬀects.
5.3.1 Time Series Identiﬁcation
One way to identify the eﬀects of Pell Grants is to compare changes in
students’ outcomes after systematic changes in Pell Grants occur. For ex-
ample, the Pell Grant program began in 1973. Previous work by Kane
(1995) compares low-income student enrollment rates before and after the
Pell Grant program was established. Kane ﬁnds that college rates grew
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groups, suggesting that the Pell Grant had little eﬀect. Other systematic
changes in Pell Grant formulae are described in Mortenson (1988). For the
study at hand, I am presenting evidence for a single cohort, so time series
variation will not be useful in identifying the eﬀects of Pell Grants.
5.3.2 Panel Identiﬁcation
Another way to identify the eﬀects of Pell Grants is to look at changes in
students’ Pell Grants over time. While this seems like a promising strategy
since the OBR data contain two years of data for a single cohort, there are
a number of reasons why this strategy might be limited.
To see the limitations and possibilities of this identiﬁcation strategy, we
need to understand how variations over time are generated for a single in-
dividual. There are really three basic reasons that a student’s Pell Grant
would change from one year to the next. First, the generosity of the Pell
Grant may change. This could be the result of systematic changes in the
Pell Grant formula or by a change in college tuition. Such changes are
likely to be exogenous, and if they generate enough variation, they may
help researchers to accurately identify the eﬀects of Pell Grants. Unfortu-
nately, there is little variation over time in the period of time that the OBR
data are available. From the 1999–2000 school year to the 2000–2001
school year, the maximum Pell Grant increased from $3,125 to $3,300, a
5.6 percent increase. Over the same time, tuition at Ohio schools increased
by 5 percent across the board (OBR 2001).
Another source of variation comes from changes in students’ college
choices. Students may transfer to another school after the ﬁrst year. The
corresponding change in tuition will generate variation in students’ Pell
Grants. Unfortunately, this source of variation does not help identify the
eﬀects of Pell Grants. Students who transfer may have diﬀerent abilities
than those students who do not transfer. For example, a student with high
ability may transfer from a two- to a four-year college to gain access to
more opportunities. This student’s Pell Grant would automatically in-
crease. However, this increase is correlated with the student’s ability and
may confound causal estimates of the Pell Grant. Another reason why us-
ing variation from transfer behavior may be misleading is that the size of
students’ Pell Grants may aﬀect transfer behavior, making it even more
diﬃcult to interpret and identify the eﬀects of Pell Grants using variation
caused by student transfer behavior. Thus, changes in Pell Grants resulting
from transfer decisions will not generate variation in Pell Grants that can
be legitimately used to identify the eﬀect of Pell Grants alone.
A ﬁnal reason that students’ Pell Grants may change is due to changes in
students’ circumstances. Some changes may be legitimate sources of varia-
tion. For example, a family of four with one child in college may have a sec-
ond child come of college age, causing the existing college student’s Pell
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child or separation) may increase a student’s Pell Grant. Even the natural
aging of parents should increase students’ Pell Grants, although only
slightly. However, there are other changes in family circumstances that may
not be legitimate sources of variation. For example, changes in income due
to unemployment or health shocks may reduce family income and conse-
quently increase students’ Pell Grants from year to year. These sources of
variation may also aﬀect the likelihood that a student persists in college.
For panel identiﬁcation strategies to be successful, variation in the Pell
Grants must come from sources that are exogenous from changes in stu-
dents’ stop-out behavior. As mentioned previously, the most legitimate
changes come from changes in the Pell Grant formula, changes in tuition,
and changes in family size or sibling attendance. I can use changes from
these legitimate sources as instruments for actual changes in ﬁnancial aid.
Constructing the instrument from changes in the Pell Grant formula and
tuition is straightforward. I simply impute what students’ Pell Grants
would have been during the 2000–2001 school year, assuming that their ﬁ-
nancial and family information is unchanged from the 1999–2000 school
year. The imputed 2000–2001 Pell Grant does not include variation from
changes in students’ (or their families’) circumstances. It only includes
variation arising from changes in the Pell Grant formula and tuition.
Imputing student data not only allows me to isolate exogenous varia-
tion, but it also allows me to estimate data for many students for whom ﬁ-
nancial data are missing. In the 1999–2000 school year, 35,233 students
ﬁled FAFSAs. However, 12,143 of these students did not ﬁle FAFSAs in
the 2000–2001 school year (hereafter referred to as the “nonﬁlers”). These
nonﬁlers are not a random subset of all students. These nonﬁlers include
2/3 of all students who withdrew from college after the 1999–2000 school
year. For these individuals, I am missing ﬁnancial data and information
about changes in their siblings’ college attendance for the 2000–2001
school year. Because the imputation assumes that students’ ﬁnancial in-
formation is unchanged from their ﬁrst to second year of college, I can es-
timate data for these nonﬁlers.
If I had data for all nonﬁlers, I could estimate out the causal eﬀect of Pell
Grants by using the imputed grant as an instrument for the actual grant.
The instrumental variable estimate would be an unbiased estimate of the
eﬀect. Unfortunately, because the actual data are not available for nonﬁl-
ers, I can only estimate reduced-form regressions of stop-out behavior on
the imputed Pell Grant. Because there is a signiﬁcant, positive relationship
between students’ imputed Pell Grants and their actual Pell Grants, the re-
duced-form estimates of the relationship between imputed Pell Grants and
stop-out behavior should give us a sense of the sign and signiﬁcance of the
eﬀect of actual Pell Grants, but the reduced-form estimates will not give a
precise estimate of the magnitude of such an eﬀect.
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out behavior against the imputed increase in a student’s Pell Grant from
one year to the next measured in thousands of dollars. For students who
withdrew or transfer, I impute the Pell Grant that students would have re-
ceived if they remained at the same institution as their initial enrollment.
Column (1) shows the results with ﬁxed eﬀects for school of attendance but
no covariates. Column (2) shows the results without ﬁxed eﬀects for college
of enrollment but with covariates for gender, age, campus living condi-
tions, whether the student took the ACT exam, and GPA in the student’s
ﬁrst years. Column (3) includes both ﬁxed eﬀects and covariates.
As column (1) shows, students whose Pell Grants increase are less likely
to drop out. Without covariates, the coeﬃcient suggests that a $1,000 in-
crease in a student’s Pell Grant leads to an 8.6 percentage point decrease in
the likelihood that the student withdraws. With covariates, the estimated
coeﬃcient implies that a $1,000 increase in a student’s Pell Grant corre-
sponds to a 9.2 percentage point decrease in the likelihood that the student
withdraws. These estimates suggest strongly and consistently that in-
creases in ﬁnancial aid decrease the likelihood that students withdraw from
school.
Column (4) repeats the analysis, focusing only on the students whose ini-
tial college enrollment was at a four-year campus. As before, the estimated
coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant. A $1,000 increase in students’ im-
puted Pell Grants corresponds to a 6.4 percent reduction in the likelihood
that students withdraw from college.
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Table 5.3 Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Stop-Out Behavior on Changes in Pell
Grants: Results with Panel Data (dependent variable: student stopped out)





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Imputed increase in ﬁnancial  –.086 –.092 –.092 –.064 .018
aid (000s) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.008)
Level of ﬁnancial aid in  .025 .026 .020 .006
1999–2000 (000s) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Includes covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Includes campus ﬁxed eﬀects Yes NoY e s Y e sY e s
No. of observations 35,233 35,233 35,233 21,506 24,116
Source: Author’s calculations from unpublished data from the Ohio Board of Regents.
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Samples in columns (1) to (3) include all students
who ﬁled FAFSAs in 1999–2000. Column (4) focuses only on students who attended a four-year college
in 1999–2000. Column (5) includes only those students who applied for ﬁnancial aid in both years. Co-
variates include the following: an indicator for whether the student was from out of state; age; gender;
whether the student lives on campus; whether the student took the ACT exam; student’s freshman GPA;
and controls for race.Column (5) reports estimates when nonﬁlers are excluded from the anal-
ysis. As mentioned before, the students who ﬁled FAFSAs in both years are
a nonrandom subset of all students. Now the estimate is positive and sig-
niﬁcant. A $1,000 increase in a student’s ﬁnancial aid corresponds to a 2
percentage point increase in the likelihood that a student withdraws. I in-
clude the estimate of column (5) to provide some hint of what the bias may
be from excluding the nonﬁlers in the previous columns. When we include
the nonﬁlers, we get signiﬁcant, negative relationships between increases in
students’ Pell Grants and the likelihood that students drop out; however,
when these students are omitted, the estimates are positive and signiﬁcant.
One might be able to further reﬁne the estimates of students’ Pell Grants
in the cases where data are missing by using information about students’
siblings. If ages or graduation dates were known or could be approximated,
I could include this information in the estimation of what students’ Pell
Grants would have been in the 2000–2001 school year. Unfortunately, little
information is available about students’ siblings for the nonﬁlers.9
What conclusion should be drawn from the panel identiﬁcation speciﬁ-
cations? First, panel identiﬁcation has only limited power to actually iden-
tify the eﬀects of Pell Grants. Much of the variation created over time in a
student’s Pell Grant comes from sources that may also aﬀect the probabil-
ity that the student withdraws from school. It would be inappropriate to
use this type of variation to identify the eﬀects of Pell Grants. Second, the
fact that many students, especially those who plan to withdraw from
school, do not ﬁle FAFSAs in both years makes it diﬃcult to estimate the
eﬀect of ﬁnancial aid. When we impute data for these people, we ﬁnd esti-
mates suggesting that increases in ﬁnancial aid reduce the likelihood that
students withdraw from college.
5.3.3 Cross-Sectional Identiﬁcation
One might also identify the eﬀects of need-based ﬁnancial aid by com-
paring the need-based awards of diﬀerent students at a single moment in
time. There are a number of reasons why students may have diﬀerent need-
based awards. Students may diﬀer from each other in terms of personal in-
come and assets, family income and assets, family size, parental age, col-
lege of attendance, and enrollment status (full- versus part-time). All of
these diﬀerences will lead to diﬀerences in students’ need-based ﬁnancial
aid. Much of this variation will not be helpful in identifying the eﬀects of
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9. Some information about the family (parental age, family size in 1999–2000, number of
children in college in 1999–2000, parental marital status) may help predict changes in the
number of children attending college; however, their predictive power is limited. When I
model changes in sibling attendance on these variables, I get a very low R2. After rounding the
predicted values to the nearest integer, the speciﬁcation predicts that 0.05 percent of students
who ﬁled FAFSAs in both periods would have had a change in the number of siblings at-
tending college. In reality, 20.5 percent of students had a change in the number of siblings at-
tending college.Pell Grants. These sources of variation will also likely aﬀect students’
dropout behavior, independent of need-based awards.
However, there is some variation across individuals that might be useful.
In particular, diﬀerences in family size and the number of children in col-
lege may facilitate identiﬁcation in a cross section. The Pell Grant formula
contains a number of discontinuities, the largest of which is based on fam-
ily size and the number of students attending college. Even these sources of
variation may not be exogenous. For example, if a family can only aﬀord
to send one child to school, they may choose the student who has the most
potential to beneﬁt from college. This student’s Pell Grant would likely be
smaller than it would be for a comparable family that sent multiple children
to school. However, in this example, comparing this solitary student to
other families with multiple children attending would lead to a bias be-
cause the family with fewer children in college sent a child to college with
a greater chance of succeeding. As a result of this potential bias, I will pri-
marily focus on results that take advantage of discontinuities in family size.
I will also brieﬂy show estimates based on discontinuities in both family
size and the number of children in college.
Table 5.4 shows the changes in Pell Grants that accompany changes in
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Table 5.4 Pell Grant by Family Size and the Number of Children in College
Number of Children in College
Number in Family 1234
Income   $40,000
2 $2,175 $2,475 n.a. n.a.
3 $2,875 $2,775 $2,775 n.a.
4 $3,125 $3,125 $2,975 $2,875
5 $3,125 $3,125 $3,125 $3,075
6 $3,125 $3,125 $3,125 $3,125
Income   $50,000
2 $975 $1,775 n.a. n.a.
3 $1,575 $2,175 $2,275 n.a.
4 $2,325 $2,425 $2,575 $2,575
5 $3,125 $2,825 $2,775 $2,775
6 $3,125 $3,125 $3,075 $2,975
Income   $60,000
2$ 0 $975 n.a. n.a.
3 $400 $1,475 $1,775 n.a.
4 $1,075 $1,825 $2,175 $2,275
5 $1,875 $2,275 $2,375 $2,475
6 $2,675 $2,675 $2,675 $2,675
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: Calculations assume that the families have zero assets and no student contribution in
the computation of the estimated family contribution. Calculations also assume that students
attend high-cost institutions. n.a.   not applicable.family size. The table shows three diﬀerent schedules linking family size
and the number of children attending college.10Each schedule corresponds
to a diﬀerent income level ($40,000; $50,000; or $60,000). For example,
among the families with $50,000 in income, a family of two with one in col-
lege would receive a Pell Grant of $975. If the family was actually a three-
person family with one in college, then the Pell Grant would be $1,575 per
person. Figure 5.1 shows similar comparisons for diﬀerent family sizes.
There are three lines corresponding to family sizes of three, four, and ﬁve.
The Pell Grants shown in the ﬁgure assume that only one child is attending
college. As seen, the diﬀerences in family size can lead to systematic diﬀer-
ences in students’ Pell Grants. These systematic diﬀerences create discon-
tinuities that can be exploited to estimate the eﬀect of Pell Grants on stu-
dents.
Assuming that the diﬀerences between family size are unrelated to a stu-
How Financial Aid Aﬀects Persistence 225
10. The computations assume that the family has no assets and that the students do not
contribute to the family’s estimated family contribution.
Fig. 5.1 Pell Grants by family size
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: The estimated Pell Grants are formulated assuming no assets or student contribution.
The Pell Grants further assume that only one person from the family is attending a high-cost
institution.dent’s success in college, comparisons can be made between families of
diﬀerent sizes who have the same number of children in college. However,
as table 5.4 shows, there is heterogeneity in income (and thus Pell Grant)
within a given family size. For discontinuity analysis to work, the families
on either side of the discontinuity should be similar except for the discon-
tinuity. As a result, when making comparisons across family sizes, we need
to stratify the groups so that comparisons are made across relatively ho-
mogeneous groups (e.g., people with similar income and assets).
Intuitively, the easiest way to estimate the eﬀect of the Pell Grant while
taking advantage of this discontinuity is to use a Wald estimator (Wald
1940). To ﬁnd the Wald estimator, one must ﬁrst isolate two groups that are
fairly homogeneous. Across the groups, the Wald estimator is found by
taking the ratio of the diﬀerences across groups of the dependent variable
(stop-out behavior) and the independent variable (size of the Pell Grant).
For example, suppose we could identify all people who have low income
and few assets and have one child in college. Some of these families are two-
person families, and some are three-person families. Assuming that family
size is uncorrelated with an individual’s success in college, we could esti-
mate a Wald estimator across these groups. Let yibe the average withdrawal
rate for group i. Group i takes on a value of 1 for the group of students in
two-person families with one in college and 2 for the group of students in
three-person families with one in college. Let xi be the average Pell Grant
for group i. The Wald estimator between these groups would then be











The denominator should be the expected change in the Pell Grant as a
result of this discontinuity within this income-asset group. The numerator
would be the diﬀerence in stop-out rates between these groups.
After computing the ﬁrst Wald statistic, we could then create a Wald es-
timator between each income-asset grouping within the sets of two- and
three-person families. If we had ten income-asset groupings, we would
have ten Wald estimators. These Wald estimators can be combined by tak-
ing a weighted average of the estimators (weighted by the number of obser-
vations in each group 2). We could similarly create Wald estimators across
adjacent groupings of family size. For example, we could compare three-
and four-person families. Of course, in the estimation of each Wald statis-
tic we would actually have multiple Wald statistics comparing income-
asset groupings across each discontinuity.
While this approach seems straightforward, other discontinuities in the
Pell Grant formula complicate the estimation of Wald statistics. For ex-
ample, there are some income ranges where students would receive the
maximum Pell Grant regardless of their family size or the number of chil-
dren attending college. The Wald statistic would not be deﬁned (or would
226 Eric Bettingerbe greatly inﬂated) over these ranges. Similarly, the Wald statistic will not
be deﬁned for families that would have received no Pell Grant regardless of
their family size or the number of children in college. Because these groups
will likely create additional noise in the estimation, we may want to exclude
these groups at times.
Before estimating the Wald statistics, we need to create the income-asset
groupings needed to create comparisons between homogeneous groups. To
create groupings, I reestimate each student’s Pell Grant, assuming that he
or she belonged to a two-person family with only one person attending col-
lege. I then divide this group into six subgroups, based on the revised Pell
Grant:
1. People whose Pell Grant in a two-person family with one in college
would have been at the maximum of $3,125
2. People with revised Pell Grants between $3,124 and $2,001
3. People with revised Pell Grants between $2,000 and $1,001
4. People with revised Pell Grants between $1,000 and $401
5. People with revised Pell Grants at the Pell Grant minimum of $400
6. People with revised Pell Grants equal to zero
Having uniform groupings across cells makes it much easier to estimate
the Wald statistics and their standard errors. Creating groupings around
Pell Grant values also avoids the problem that wealthier families are more
likely to apply if they have more children. These families are identiﬁed in
subgroup 6. Also, I separate people who would have had the Pell Grant
minimum ($400) because in the Pell Grant formula there is a discontinuity
that allows families across a wider range of income to have this value of Pell
Grant. I use these revised Pell Grants only for the purpose of creating ho-
mogeneous groups (i.e., identifying families with similar assets and in-
comes). When actually computing the Wald statistics, I use the actual Pell
Grants.
Figure 5.2shows an example of how the discontinuity works. The sample
of students is from subgroup 3. These students would have had similar Pell
Grants had their family size not been diﬀerent. The left axis of ﬁgure 5.2
plots these students’ actual Pell Grants across family size. The Pell Grant
increases with the number of children. The right-side axis of ﬁgure 5.2 plots
the stop-out rates for these students. The stop-out rate declines for stu-
dents with larger families. Assuming that family size aﬀects stop-out rates
only through its eﬀect on Pell Grant size, then stop-out rates are negatively
related to Pell Grant size for these students. We could produce similar ﬁg-
ures for each homogeneous group of students.
Table 5.5 shows the regression-based Wald estimates for the whole
sample. Following Angrist (1991), the eﬃcient combination of Wald esti-
mators is just the instrumental variables estimate of y (stop-out behavior)
on x (size of Pell Grant), where dummy variables for each homogeneous
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Source: Author’s calculations from unpublished data from the OBR.
Notes:Sample is restricted to families whose assets and income are such that their college-age
children would have had a Pell Grant between one and two thousand dollars if they had only
had one child.
Table 5.5 Wald/Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates of Eﬀect of Financial Aid on
Stop-Out Behavior
Wald Wald Dependent IV with  Wald Family
ACTV ariable   Campus and  Child
Wald Sample ACT Score IV Fixed Eﬀects Discount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level of Pell Grant in  –.037 –.012 .100 –.029 .0004 –.036
1999–2000 (in 000s) (.009) (.010) (.099) (.004) (.004) (.009)
No. of observations 6,114 4,470 4,470 29,936 29,936 6,398
Source: Author’s calculations from unpublished data from the Ohio Board of Regents.
Notes:White standard errors are reported in parentheses. Columns (1)–(3) and (6) include only students
with positive Pell Grants less than the maximum. In columns (4) and (5) the instrument for “Level of Pell
Grant” is the residual from a regression of Pell Grant on a quartic of the key variables determining Pell
Grants (family income, assets, family size, number of children in college). The IV columns exclude fam-
ilies with income greater than $115,000 or assets greater than $150,000. Campus ﬁxed eﬀects are in-
cluded in the ﬁrst stage of the speciﬁcation in column (5) to control for the fact that diﬀerent school costs
will lead to diﬀerent size Pell Grants.group and family size combination are used as instruments for x. For ex-
ample, if all families were two, three, or four people in size, then I would in-
clude eighteen dummy variables as instruments (i.e., for each of the six ho-
mogeneous income/asset subgroupings deﬁned previously, I would include
three dummy variables for the possible family sizes).
Column (1) of table 5.5 shows the instrumental variable estimate when I
estimate the regression excluding those for whom there is no variation in
Pell Grants.11 The estimated eﬀect is negative and signiﬁcant. A $1,000 in-
crease in Pell Grants stemming from diﬀerences in family size corresponds
to a 4 percentage point decrease in likelihood that a student drops out. The
result suggests that systematic diﬀerences in Pell Grants lead to diﬀerences
in stop-out rates for students. Larger Pell Grants reduce students’ proba-
bilities of withdrawing.
In column (2) of table 5.5, I include only the students who took the ACT
exam. The estimated eﬀect suggests that a $1,000 increase in a student’s
Pell Grant leads to a 1.2 percentage point reduction in the probability that
a student withdraws although the result is not statistically signiﬁcant. In
column (3), I provide a speciﬁcation test. Rather than use stop-out behav-
ior as the dependent variable, I use the ACT score. If the speciﬁcation is
correctly identiﬁed, there should be no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
ACT scores between groups. Indeed, the estimated relationship is indistin-
guishable from zero.
Another way to estimate the eﬀects of a Pell Grant is to use an instru-
mental variable approach where the “delinearized” Pell Grant is used as an
instrument for the actual Pell Grant. To do this, I run a regression of the
actual Pell Grant on a quartic in the key variables that determine the Pell
Grant (family income, family assets, family size, and number of children in
the family attending college). The residuals from this regression should be
made up primarily of discontinuities in the Pell Grant formula along these
dimensions. I then use the residual as an instrument for the actual Pell
Grant in a simple regression of stop-out behavior on students’ Pell
Grants.12 I restrict the sample to students whose families have less than
$150,000 in assets or less than $115,000 in annual income. The results ap-
pear in columns (4) and (5) of table 5.5. Similar to column (3), I ﬁnd that a
$1,000 increase in a Pell Grant is associated with a 3 percentage point re-
duction in the likelihood that a student drops out.
In column (5), I use a similar procedure except that I put campus ﬁxed
eﬀects in the regression that predicts students’ Pell Grants. This is impor-
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11. The maximum income in this group is $25,000.
12. This is identical to running a regression of stop-out behavior on the Pell Grant value
and a quartic in the variables that determine the Pell Grant. These strategies estimate the same
estimator with only a negligible change in standard errors. I report the standard errors from
the “instrument” approach because it may be intuitively easier to identify what source of vari-
ation is behind the estimated eﬀect.tant because diﬀerent campus costs can lead to diﬀerences in the size of
students’ Pell Grants. Again, I use the residuals from this ﬁrst stage as an
instrument in the next. The results drop in magnitude and are statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
The ﬁnal column of table 5.5 estimates the eﬀects of Pell Grants using
both the discontinuities from family size and the number of children in col-
lege. I use the same methodology except now I compare diﬀerences in Pell
Grants resulting from diﬀerences in the number of children going to col-
lege as well. The results are similar to those in column (1). I ﬁnd that a
$1,000 increase in Pell Grants corresponds to a 4 percent reduction in the
likelihood that students withdraw.
What conclusions should be drawn? First, while the estimates reinforce
a negative relationship between the size of one’s Pell Grant and stop-out
behavior, they are not completely robust to speciﬁcation. When I focus on
the sample taking the ACT (column [2]) and when I include additional
campus level controls (column [5]), the results are indistinguishable from
zero. Additionally, there is substantial heterogeneity around the disconti-
nuity, and eﬀorts to create comparisons among homogeneous groups may
not fully account for the heterogeneity. Overall the results seem supportive
of those in the panel identiﬁcation although the results are not robust to
diﬀerent subsamples.
5.4 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper set out to estimate the eﬀects of Pell Grants on student re-
tention. Using panel and cross-sectional variation as sources of identiﬁca-
tion, this paper attempts to estimate the relationship. The panel identiﬁ-
cation results suggest strongly that a Pell Grant reduces dropout rates. The
regression-discontinuity results show similar results although they are
more fragile. The regression-discontinuity results, however, are less likely
to be biased by other factors than the speciﬁcations that use cross-sectional
variation.
The ﬁnding that Pell Grants aﬀect student persistence has several policy
implications. Most importantly, it implies that federal and state need-
based policies and aid matter and that they inﬂuence the likelihood that
students continue from year to year in college. Even if these aid programs
have no eﬀect on enrollment (as Kane [1999] and Leslie and Brinkman
[1987] show), need-based programs may impact educational attainment.
The ﬁnding that aid increases persistence may suggest that front-loaded ﬁ-
nancial aid programs may improve student retention in the ﬁrst years of
college.13
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13. DesJardins, Ahlburg, and McCall (2002) ﬁnd that frontloaded aid programs have a
“modest impact” on student retention.The results in this paper may also support conclusions in Dynarski
(2003) and Bound and Turner (2002). These papers focused on beneﬁciar-
ies of the Social Security Student Beneﬁt Program and the GI Bill, respec-
tively. The papers found that need-based aid aﬀected both enrollment and
completion.
While many policymakers may view the ﬁnding that need-based aid im-
proves retention as being “good” for society, it is not clear that this is so. As
Jonathan Guryan points out in the comment that follows this chapter,
more education may not be optimal for all students in society. There may
be a number of students who do not have the skills and for whom a college
degree may not improve earnings. If these students are the marginal stu-
dents for whom the Pell Grant program inﬂuences college persistence, then
the measured eﬀect in this paper may reﬂect an ineﬃcient use of societal
resources.
In order to fully resolve the question of whether increased persistence is
“good” for society, we would need to know how an additional year of edu-
cation aﬀects the earnings for these marginal students. In estimates of the
returns of education for the entire population, Jaeger and Page (1996) ar-
gue that the returns to a second year of college have signiﬁcant eﬀects on
earnings, particularly if students ﬁnish an associate’s degree. These esti-
mates suggest that persistence into the second year of college is a positive
outcome; however, the estimated return in Jaeger and Page (1996) is for the
whole population. It is not clear that this estimated return would be the
same for the marginal students aﬀected by Pell Grants. Evidence from To-
bias (2003) suggests that the returns to education are concentrated at the
highest-ability students and remain small for lower-ability students. More-
over, as Sarah Turner points out in chapter 1 of this volume, the marginal
students are likely less prepared for college and more likely to hold a Gen-
eral Education Development certiﬁcation (GED) than a high school di-
ploma.14 There is little empirical evidence on the returns to an additional
year of college for these students.
Finally, there are two empirical points that should be considered in in-
terpreting the results in this paper. First, the paper focuses solely on stu-
dent persistence between the ﬁrst and second year of college in adjacent
years. Researchers have documented the growing trend of students to take
breaks at various times during college (e.g., chap. 1 in this volume). Des-
Jardins, Ahlburg, and McCall (2002) examine enrollment probabilities
over a longer stretch of time. They ﬁnd that need-based aid has no long-run
eﬀect on enrollment probabilities. They are using a sample in which stu-
dents repeatedly enter and exit higher education. While the sample they use
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14. Many of these students enroll in college remediation. Ongoing research by Bettinger
and Long (2003) examines the eﬀect of college remediation on college outcomes and student
earnings.focuses on students who initially enrolled at a four-year campus, their ﬁnd-
ing suggests that examining the eﬀect of ﬁnancial aid on retention over a
longer stretch of time may be important.
Second, as states continue to gather more complete and expansive data
on their students, economists and other researchers will be able to employ
methods that exploit variation in Pell Grant formulae. However, even if
better data are available, researchers should take care in how they deal with
changes in Pell Grant eligibility and missing data. Students who leave
school after their ﬁrst year are less likely to ﬁle additional FAFSAs, mak-
ing it diﬃcult for researchers to measure their ﬁnancial status. Research
that fails to control for these missing data may be biased.
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Comment Jonathan Guryan
Eric Bettinger presents a careful analysis of an overlooked but important
question. Economic researchers have noted the large sums of money the
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ate School of Business, and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search.United States spends on subsidies for college costs annually and have re-
sponded with a number of studies on the eﬀect of subsidies on college ma-
triculation decisions. But few have investigated the impact of these subsi-
dies on what Bettinger calls “stop-out” behavior, the choice to leave college
after the ﬁrst year. One might ask why stop-out behavior is an interesting
outcome to examine. The answer is simple: A lot of college students do it.
Twenty-eight percent of ﬁrst-time full-time freshmen in Ohio do not return
to school the next year. Depending on whether one considers stopping out
an unambiguously negative outcome—a point I will discuss shortly—this
number may be a signal of a large problem. What are the likely causes of
stop-out decisions? Signiﬁcant suspects include failing out, realization
that the decision to attend college was wrong for the student, changes at
home, cost concerns, or an inability or unwillingness to pay tuition. The
latter factor is one that is easily manipulated by policy, so Bettinger asks
whether subsidies aﬀect stop-out decisions.
Bettinger has compiled a unique and detailed data set for this project.
The data from the Ohio Board of Regents track every college student in the
state of Ohio for the 1999–2000 and 2000–2001 school years and are
merged to detailed ﬁnancial aid data. The data allow Bettinger to measure
stop-out behavior better than has been possible in the past. Previously, re-
searchers could not distinguish students who left college to return home to
work from students who transferred to a diﬀerent school. Bettinger is able
to track any student who transfers to another college in Ohio.
The linked detailed ﬁnancial aid data allow Bettinger to employ two
estimation strategies. In the ﬁrst strategy, Bettinger estimates whether
changes in Pell Grants for individual students from the ﬁrst year of college
to the second aﬀect stop-out decisions. He isolates variation in Pell Grant
changes that is otherwise unrelated to stop-out behavior. In the second
strategy, Bettinger compares the stop-out behavior of students with
slightly diﬀerent characteristics that cause them to have signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent Pell Grants. Both empirical strategies suggest that larger Pell Grants
lead to a smaller propensity to leave college after one year.
I would like to make two points about this research agenda. First, it is
important to understand the eﬀect the Pell Grant has on college matricu-
lation if we want to interpret the estimates of the eﬀect of the Pell Grant on
stop-out behavior. Because we do not have conclusive evidence on the for-
mer question, we must be careful when interpreting the evidence brought
to bear on the latter. A simple empirical model will help to clarify this
point. Bettinger estimates the eﬀect of Pell Grants on stop-out behavior in
two ways. Each method is intended to isolate the causal eﬀect of a dollar of
Pell Grant on the likelihood that an enrolled freshman will not return to
school the following fall. Consider the following model of stop-out behav-
ior for students currently enrolled as freshmen:
234 Eric Bettinger(1) stopoutit 1    0Pellit 1    1Pellit 1   Iit    2Iit   Xit 1  εit 1,
where stopoutit 1 indicates that the student does not return to school in
year t   1, Pellit 1 is the size of the Pell Grant for which the student is eligi-
ble in year t   1, Xit 1 is a vector of individual characteristics, εit 1 is a ran-
dom error term, and Iit is a variable that indicates whether the student was
induced to attend college by the Pell Grant in year t.1 Without a good esti-
mate of which students were induced to begin college by the Pell Grant, we
are forced to estimate the model excluding Pellit 1   Iit and Iit.
For most policy questions, we are interested in knowing the magnitudes
of  0 and  1. These parameters tell us how sensitive particular students are
to changes in the price of college. However, because we are forced to esti-
mate the model without information indicating which students matricu-
lated because of the Pell Grant, we can only estimate the correlation be-
tween the Pell Grant and stop-out behavior among freshmen college
students. For ease of exposition, allow me to partial out the variation in de-
mographic characteristics (Xit) and denote with asterisks the orthogonal
variation in the remaining variables. The regression estimate of the eﬀect
of the Pell Grant on stop-out behavior is





























The ﬁrst two terms conﬁrm Bettinger’s contention that the estimated eﬀect
combines the price sensitivity of both groups of students. There is reason to
believe that students induced to matriculate by the Pell Grant are more price
sensitive on the stop-out margin as well ( 1 0). If we are interested in how
many students continue past their ﬁrst year of college because of the Pell
Grant program, then we need to know the magnitude of  0. To the extent
that  1   0, Bettinger’s estimate is an overestimate of the magnitude of  0.
The ﬁnal term highlights that there is an additional source of bias. It is
likely that cov(Pell∗
it 1, I∗
it)   0. All students induced to begin college by a
Pell Grant received a Pell Grant, while most of the rest of the population
received no Pell Grant. Additionally, a marginal increase in the Pell Grant
may increase the likelihood that Iit   1 but should not decrease that likeli-
hood. It is also likely that students induced to begin college by the Pell
Grant have an inherently larger propensity to leave college after the ﬁrst
year ( 2   0). If true, this combination of factors would induce a positive
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1. Note that the cross-sectional regressions presented in section 5.3.3 estimate  1, while the
panel estimates presented in section 5.3.2 estimate a similar model in which Pellit is replaced
with  Pellit.The second point I would like to discuss is the idea that reducing stop-
out behavior is not necessarily a good outcome. Like all goods, education
comes at a cost. The economy as a whole bears the cost of allocating re-
sources to provide education, and the individual investing in education
bears a related cost, including both explicit tuition payments and forgone
earnings. As economists, we usually assume that an individual weighs the
potential beneﬁts of attending college against the costs she must bear to do
so. The Pell Grant, like any subsidy of higher education, lowers the net
price of college. Viewed this way, it would be quite surprising if there were
no resulting change in eligible students’ propensity to stay in college. Any-
one close enough to the margin between staying in college and dropping
out should be signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the change in price. The question
at hand is how many students are close enough to that margin. Our evalu-
ation of the Pell Grant program should also consider whether the subsidy
helps the economy utilize resources more eﬃciently, by directing education
resources to those who would beneﬁt most or by directing the economy’s
resources to those who value them most.
Indeed, the increased education for the Pell Grant recipient comes at a
cost. Resources in the form of teachers’ time, library and computing facil-
ities, and classroom space could have been used to educate someone else.
The government funds could have been spent on welfare, on the Center for
Disease Control, to buttress the Social Security trust fund, or to lower
taxes. So we must ask two important questions. First, can students with the
help of their parents eﬀectively weigh the beneﬁts of a college education
against the costs they will have to bear? And second, are the costs that stu-
dents must bear to attend college diﬀerent from the total cost to the econ-
omy to provide the resources necessary to educate the student? These ques-
tions are addressed in multiple chapters of this book. It seems reasonable
that many high school students, when making this decision, respond to in-
centives they probably should ignore and poorly estimate the costs and
beneﬁts of college. Risk-averse students who heavily discount the future
may fear the uncertainty associated with the beneﬁts of college that will not
come for many years. All of these factors can cause students to drop out
of school before they reach the level that would maximize their lifetime
wealth.
If Pell Grants correct systematic mistakes made by students, as discussed
in other chapters of this book, or if they compensate for higher borrowing
costs that are due to discrimination or asymmetric information, then we
should conclude such education price subsidies improve how education re-
sources are allocated. If Pell Grants reduce stop-out behavior by students
who are highly risk-averse or greatly discount the future, then supporters
of college subsidies must justify the paternal nature of the federal govern-
ment telling college-aged students what will be best for them when they
“grow up.” If Pell Grants increase the educational attainment of students
236 Eric Bettingersolely because the price of college is lower, then it would seem easy to ar-
gue that there are better uses of government funds.
Bettinger has taken an important ﬁrst step in recognizing the prevalence
of stop-out behavior and in analyzing the eﬀect of the Pell Grant on stu-
dents’ decisions to continue in college past the ﬁrst year. He has comprised
a unique data set, which is sure to produce additional important research
going forward. The results indeed suggest that changes in individual Pell
Grants aﬀect year-to-year college attendance. The next important ques-
tion in this research agenda is why.
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